This article theoretically and experimentally examines the twin problems of free-riding and coordination failure faced by blood banks, by investigating the effects of information provision on the efficiency of blood donation. We augment a standard linear public goods game, incorporating the following features of blood donation: multiplicity of public goods (to reflect intertemporal coordination issues), current and upcoming upper bound demands (to incorporate the perishable nature of blood and the embargo period of consecutive donations), and semi-binary choices (to account for individual options to withhold donations or make donations and when). We analyze whether a provision of deterministic information on the potential blood demand (full information) would improve the efficiency of blood donation when compared to the provision of probabilistic information (partial information). The theory predicts that if each individual maximizes the payoff-sum of all players, then the full information provision would achieve donation efficiency in equilibrium. The results of laboratory experiment show that the full information provision does not improve the efficiency of donation, on an average. We find that full information improves intertemporal coordination, but it worsens the free-riding problem. Although information helps individuals to direct donations in response to the demand, it drives individuals to withhold donations to avoid potential wastage against the risk of donation over the upper bound. When the predicted total demand is relatively small, that is, when strategic uncertainty about others donation matters for achieving efficiency, the provision of information about intertemporal demand in upper bounds tends to lower efficiency because the "donation withholding" effect becomes dominant.
Introduction
Human blood is an essential input of many pharmacological products. Whole blood transfusions save lives of patients with acute blood losses; platelets supplement white blood cells in patients undergoing cancer treatments; and plasma is used for treating burns, inflections, and hepatitis. In Japan, the Blood Law requires these blood products to be manufactured using only domestically supplied blood donated by volunteers. The proportion of actual blood donors to potential donors is about 5.7% in Japan (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2014) , which is among the 10 lowest of the high-income countries (Slonim, Wang and Garbarino, 2014) . Given Japan's aging population and the diminishing pool of potential donors, there are growing concerns about meeting the excess demand for blood products in Japan, which is predicted to peak at 850,000 donations in 2027 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2014) . 1 To counter the predicted shortage of donated blood, blood banks in Japan are seeking ways to overcome the twin problems of free-riding and coordination failure. The free-riding problem occurs because the private marginal cost of donation exceeds the private marginal benefit of volunteer donors. An intertemporal coordination problem arises because blood is perishable and an embargo period must be maintained between consecutive blood donations (between 4 to 16 weeks). Blood products are manufactured for each blood type and have different shelf lives-4 days for platelets, 21 days for red blood cells and whole blood, and 1 year for plasma. In the case of excess supply, there is always a risk of some blood components reaching their expiration dates before use. Moreover, the excess supply of blood at a given period preempts supply in the subsequent period, worsening the overall shortage. In the absence of signals to indicate relative scarcity, it is difficult for donors to coordinate the timing of their donations. Thus, providing information about demand, including predictions about future demand, may overcome both free-riding and coordination problems. This information provision may improve the efficiency of blood donation.
Most studies on blood donation address the free-riding problem and examine ways to increase the total volume of donated blood. However, few studies consider the problems of intertemporal coordination and efficiency. Some studies have explored various ways to increase donation by symbolic reward, social recognition (Lacetera and Macis, 2010) , pre-commitment, and moral suasion (Stutzer, Goette and Zehnder, 2011; Slonim et al., 2014) . Other studies focus their attention on motivation issues, such as crowding out of intrinsic motivation and moral hazard problems associated with monetary compensations (Titmuss, 1971; Goette, Stutzer and Frey, 2010) . Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2012) even report motivation crowd-in; in this scenario, monetary reward to some people induces donations from individuals who were not offered the reward. Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2014) is one of the few studies that addresses a coordination problem between geographical locations-monetary compensation in an area increased blood donation in that area by drawing donors from adjacent areas wherein monetary compensations were not offered. This study addresses the issue of seasonal coordination and the efficiency of blood donations.
Generally, blood donation campaigns and blood banks maintain only an instantaneous balance between the required blood products (demand) and blood donation (supply) by appealing to potential donors. According to Slonim et al. (2014) , "because blood donors are a diffuse and independent group who make decision with limited information on needs (given that there is no price to indicate higher or lower need), they cannot easily coordinate their actions (p.191)". In other words, in the current system, information about the estimated demand is limited in the sense that only the information on immediate demand is made available, which does not facilitate seasonal coordination of donation behavior. 2 We investigate an alternative system in which fuller information, including the expected future demand, is made available to potential donors. This information system may facilitate coordination of donations with price-like signals, enabling potential donors to respond to the scarcity of blood. In a similar vein, Slonim et al. (2014) propose a donor registry as a central clearinghouse system. 3 Contrary to the centralized clearinghouse system, we consider a decentralized system that enables independent decision makers to better coordinate their individual actions with those of the other donors, based on the additional common information provided by the blood bank.
We theoretically and experimentally examine whether information on the estimated future demand will improve the efficiency of blood donation. First, we use game theory to model blood donation decisions under two alternative information regimes-one in which subjects know only the probability distribution of demand in each period, and the other in which they know the exact demand in each period. Subsequently, we implement the model in a laboratory experiment to empirically investigate the effect of information conditions on the subjects' donation behavior.
We use a standard linear public goods game as the base model in conformity with the existing experimental literature on donations (refer to Vesterlund, 2015 for a survey on experimental literature on charitable giving). 4 We augment the model with three features to incorporate the characteristics of blood donation. The first feature is multiplicity, wherein we model the operations of a blood bank in two different periods as different public goods, with players benefiting from both the periods. The second feature involves introducing an upper bound on the effective donation for each season. When the sum of donations in a season goes beyond its upper bound, the marginal return of contribution to that season becomes zero. The different upper bounds for each season capture the seasonal demand fluctuation for the blood products. The change in the marginal return of contribution captures the fact that excess supply is wasted due to short storage life of blood components. Finally, players strategies are semi-binary: players decide whether to donate and convenient donation times 5
Our augmented model incorporates both free-riding and intertemporal coordination problems faced by blood banks. The three features do not alter the essential property of the standard public goods game, wherein free-riding is a dominant strategy of players who maximize own payoff. Even if all the players had social preference and were willing to donate blood, since it is not always efficient for all players to donate, it becomes important to coordinate donation timings and who would donate. A lack of coordination among players gives rise to coordination issues.
In order to investigate the effect of providing information about the future demand (i.e., the upper bound of the second season), we compare two different information conditions-one where the information about the upper bounds is probabilistic (referred to as the partial information condition), and 2 Coordination failure in blood donation also occurs after major disasters. For example, news about the 9/11 attacks in the U.S.A and the Great East Japan earthquake led to spontaneous blood donations beyond the actual need. 3 The registry collects information about past blood donors, including their convenient donation times and locations. The call center contacts the registered people for blood donations. A field experiment with the Australian Red Cross Blood Service reveals that the registered past donors are more likely to donate in response to a call for donation and that the registry system helps blood banks to facilitate donor coordination. Slonim et al. (2014) compared the donation behaviors of the registered and unregistered past donors. Among those contacted, 9.7% of registry members reached the venues for donation, while only 5.9% of the control subjects reached the venues after 4 weeks of receiving the calls. 4 Vesterlund (2015) explains the relevance of the public goods game for examining charitable giving. In our context, individuals who care about blood banks benefit from efficiently managed blood banks. As these benefits are enjoyed by anyone with similar concerns, donations are both non-rivalrous and non-exclusive. 5 Blood donors can make multinomial choices including how much and how to donate. In Japan, donors are given options to donate whole blood of 400ml or 200ml or to make apheresis donation of various quantities depending on their body weights. However, The Japanese Red Cross Society strongly prefers and promotes the standard 400ml whole blood donations. A majority of eligible donors donate 400 ml of whole blood. Thus, we adopt a simple binary choice to model individual decisions. the other wherein the upper bound information is deterministic (referred to as full information condition). The former represents the current provision of information of many blood banks wherein only the information on instantaneous demand is made available, and the latter represents the alternative system of information provision we aim to investigate.
Theoretically, it is predicted that information conditions affect donation outcomes differently, based on individual preferences. If each subject aims to maximize own payoff, then the information conditions will not affect individual behavior. If, on the contrary, each player aims to maximize the payoff-sum of all players, then information provision will increase efficiency. In other words, if full information on the demand is made available, then the payoff-sum maximizing individuals will match the demand in each season in the equilibrium. In contrast, if the information on the demand is unavailable, then it will be impossible to match the demand in each season. Additionally, when the demand in each season follows a uniform distribution, donations to each season will be about equal. This could cause over and under donations, depending on the realized value of the upper bounds, thereby lowering efficiency. Thus, we hypothesize that, if there are players who are efficiency-concerned, then providing information on future needs will increase efficiency.
The results of our laboratory experiment do not support the hypothesis that full information improves efficiency. We find that full information improves intertemporal coordination but it worsens the free-riding problem, which more than offsets the improved coordination. On the one hand, the demand information directs more contributions to the public good with a relatively high demand. On the other hand, demand information tends to depress subject's donations. The latter effect can be explained by strategic uncertainty, which makes subjects withhold contributions to avoid potential wastage against the risk of donation over the upper bound.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and theoretical predictions, followed by a section describing the experimental design and hypotheses. The subsequent sections compare the donation rates and efficiency under the two information conditions and discuss the possible interpretations of the subjects' behavior under the full information condition. The final section concludes the study. Appendix includes full proofs of propositions.
The Model
This section describes our blood donation model and presents the result of its theoretical analysis. Let us first sketch out the important aspects of this model and discuss its related literature. As stated in the Introduction, our model is based on the standard symmetric linear public goods game. We add three properties to the model and the reasons for incorporating them are as follows:
Upper bounds of effective donations The upper bound represents the amount of necessary donations.
Any excess donation above the upper bound does not increase the quality of public goods. This property takes into account the wastage incurred on blood products when the supply exceeds demand. This is because blood products, especially the whole blood cells and platelets, have short shelf-lives.
Multiplicity In order to consider the intertemporal feature of blood donations, we represent the blood bank in each season as a separate public good (henceforth, we will refer to the public good as "blood bank.") Additionally, we assume that the blood bank in each season is independent in the sense that blood donated above the upper bound of the effective donation in one season cannot be carried over to another season. To start the argument with the simplest case, we will consider a model with only two seasons-summer and winter.
Semi-binary choice Each player decides whether to donate in each season. We also assume that a player can donate at most once in one season. This assumption was incorporated considering the minimum gap that must be maintained between two consecutive blood donations. Thus, each player adopts the following three strategies: donating in summer, donating in winter, or not donating.
To summarize, we analyze the model of two public goods with upper bounds on the effective donations. Although this model depicts problems associated with blood donation, it contains generally applicable features. Especially, introducing an upper bound to contributions is appropriate in situations wherein excess contributions to public goods is wasted. For example, this property is considered in the case of non-monetary donations for natural disasters. During a natural disaster, such as an earthquake, excess donations are sent in kind to the disaster-stricken area immediately after the disaster. The excess donations not only get wasted, but they also paralyze the already weak transportation system and hinder the delivery of the essential goods and services. However, the donations tend to quickly fade out over time, even though the demand for donations remains unchanged. Hence, donors must coordinate their respective schedules and the amount of donation over time rather than making excessive donations at one time and insufficient donations at another time.
In relation to the existing experimental literature on the public goods game, the public goods game with upper bounds is similar to the threshold public goods game without rebate (when the sum of contributions is higher than that of the threshold, any excess contribution does not contribute toward an increase in the values of the public goods). Such threshold public goods game is studied by, for example, Erev and Rapoport (1990) , Marks and Croson (1998) , and Schram, Offerman and Sonnemans (2008) . The difference between our public goods game with the upper bound and the threshold public goods game with no rebate lies in whether the contribution gives any positive payoffs when the sum of contributions is less than that of the threshold value. In the threshold public goods game, any contribution less than the threshold value does not generate any public goods. However, in our game, it generates proportionally more public good up to the point when the contribution reaches the upper bound. 6 In terms of multiplicity, there have been a limited number of studies on multiple public goods game, except a few recent studies. The work closest to this study has been conducted by Corazzini, Cotton and Valbonesi (2015) , which analyzes the multiple threshold-public goods game without refund but with rebate. 7 These studies are similar in the sense that the subjects face a coordination problem in the game, but they differ in the type of coordination necessary. In Corazzini et al. (2015) , subjects in the game must coordinate to concentrate their contributions to some of the public goods in order to reach the threshold, while, in our game, subjects have to coordinate not to concentrate but to allocate their donations in order to avoid contributions that are over and above the upper bound.
Next, we provide the details of the model.
The basic setup
We consider a model of blood donation in a society with n ≥ 2 individuals. Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of possible donors in the society. These n individuals have the semi-binary choice of deciding whether 6 In this line of literature, our game is close to that studied in Erev and Rapoport (1990) and Schram et al. (2008) . In these studies, the contribution decision of each player is also presented as a binary choice. 7 There are several studies on multiple public goods game without a threshold. For example, Blackwell and McKee (2003) and Fellner and Lünser (2014) analyze a situation with two public goods-global public goods and local public goods. Bernasconi, Corazzini, Kube and Maréchal (2009) and Engl, Riedl and Weber (2017) analyze the case wherein there are two identical public goods. In the latter case, one public good depends on institutional support to promote contribution. The coordination problem is not discussed in these studies on the public goods game without threshold.
to donate blood, and if so, then what would be their preferred donation season: summer (s) or winter (w). We denote such a strategy of an individual i by a 2-dimensional vector x i = (x is , x iw ), where x is (respectively x iw ) takes a value of 1 if individual i donates blood in summer (respectively winter) and 0 otherwise. Additionally, we assume x is + x iw ≤ 1, which implies our restriction that each player cannot donate blood in both seasons. Hence, each player's set of strategies is {(1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0)}.
Next, we denote the upper bounds of effective donations in summer and winter as d s and d w , respectively, where d s , d w ∈ N. Throughout this study, we assume d s + d w ≤ n, which implies that there are enough individuals to satisfy the demand for blood products in both seasons. For a given number of players n, let D(n) be the set of all possible combinations of (d s , d w ). For example, when n = 3, D(3) = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)}.
Finally, we specify the payoffs of individuals. We assume that individuals receive payoffs B s and B w from the blood bank in summer and winter, respectively, and that these values are the same for all individuals. This payoff proportionally increases with the amount of blood donated, until the amount donated reaches the upper bound. To simplify the notation, let t k (x) := j∈N x jk be the sum of donations to season k in the strategy profile x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ). Using a parameter u, which denotes individual's gain from one unit of blood donated to the blood bank, the payoff to an individual from the blood bank in season k at a donation profile x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) is given as
where taking the minimum of t k (x) and d k represents the fact that any excess contribution above the upper bound d k would be wasted. Second, we assume that donating blood is costly for individuals. We denote the individual's marginal cost of donating blood as c. To summarize, individual i's payoff from donation profile x is
For the size of the parameters, we assume that u < c and nu > c. u < c reflects the fact that the individual's marginal benefit from donating one unit of blood is less than the individual's marginal cost of donating the blood. nu > c reflects the fact that the marginal benefit from donating one unit of blood to the society is larger than the marginal cost to the individual. Thus, it is efficient to donate until the upper bound is reached. Owing to these assumptions, this game presents a social dilemma situation, wherein although it is better for the society to have the players coordinate and donate up to the upper bounds, individuals have the incentive to free-ride.
Different information conditions
This study aims to investigate whether it is possible to increase the efficiency of blood donations by providing the information about the estimated future needs. In order to investigate the effects of the change in the information provision, we model the current information provision method used in reallife (partial information condition) as a game of imperfect information, wherein the upper bounds are initially determined by nature. All players do not know the realized value of the upper bounds, but they know the probability distribution in which each combination of the upper bound may occur. 8 In contrast, the new information provision method suggested in this study (full information condition) is modeled as a game of perfect information wherein the values of the upper bounds are exogenously given. Thus, full information condition is the game that has been explained so far.
In the partial information condition, we assume that there is an equal likelihood that each combination of d s and d w would occur. This would impose a discrete probability distribution over D(n) because we assume that d s , d w ∈ N and d s + d w ≤ n. For instance, as in the previous example, if n = 3, |D(n)| = 3, then each element would occur with a probability of 1/3. All the other aspects of the model are the same as that described in Section 2.1.
Theoretical prediction
In this section, we first analyze the game under the standard assumption of payoff maximizing players. We find that different information conditions do not affect the players' behavior because in both conditions it is a dominant strategy for players to free-ride. However, in laboratory experiments on the public goods game, subjects often choose contribution levels that yield higher efficiency than that of no contributions, at least in the first few periods of the game (refer to, for example, Ledyard, 1995 and Croson, 2010) . As a reference point, we also analyze the game with an alternative assumption of payoff-sum maximizing players. In this case, we find that it is possible to obtain higher efficiency in equilibrium under the full information condition than that under the partial information condition.
Payoff maximizing players
We start our analysis with the assumption of payoff maximizing players. Since the assumption of u < c and nu > c, the decision to donate or not in each season has a feature similar to that of the prisoner's dilemma game. On the one hand, it is better not to donate in either season because donating costs c. However, the benefit derived from donating is at most u. On the other hand, the outcome wherein all players do not donate is pareto dominated by the outcome wherein the sum of donations in each season is equal to its upper bound. This gives us the first proposition, wherein the dominant strategy for the players is not to donate in either season under the full information condition.
Proposition 1. Let i ∈ N . In the full information condition, for any (d s , d w ) ∈ D(n), x i = (0, 0) is the strictly dominant strategy for player i.
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. Let t k (x −i ) denote the sum of donations by players other than i. The marginal payoff for player
In either case, the marginal payoff is lower than that of the marginal payoff from not donating, which is equal to zero. Hence, for any strategy profile of players, other than i, it would be the best response for player i not to donate in either season.
Changing the information condition from full to partial does not significantly change the result in Proposition 1. It changes the calculation of the expected benefit from donating blood. However, since the expected benefit is going to be less than or equal to u, it is going to be lower than the cost c. Thus, the above result also holds for the partial information condition.
Proposition 2. Let i ∈ N . In the partial information condition, x i = (0, 0) is the strictly dominant strategy for player i.
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that if the players are maximizing own payoffs, then differences in information provision would not affect the equilibrium strategies. All players decide to completely free-ride, and no blood is donated.
Payoff-sum maximizing players
Next, we analyze the two information conditions in the case of payoff-sum maximizing players. The payoff of payoff-sum maximizing player i at strategy profile x can be written as:
From this equation, one can see that if t k (x) < d k , then the marginal benefit of donating in season k is nu and the cost is c. Since we assumed nu > c, as long as the donation is effective, additional donation will increase the payoff-sum. However, unlike the standard linear public goods game where the payoff-sum is maximized when all players contribute their whole endowment, the social optimum is obtained when the demand for blood is just met in both seasons. This is because any blood donated beyond the upper bound lowers the payoff-sum since the blood donated is wasted in the society.
Using this incentive structure, we can show the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under the full information condition, when all players maximize their payoff-sum, the strategy profile x * is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the sum of donations in each season is equal to its upper bounds.
The intuitive proof of this proposition follows two steps. The first step shows that satisfying the upper bound is a necessary condition for attaining Nash equilibrium. We show that if t k (x) = d k , then x cannot be a Nash equilibrium because we can find a player who can increase own payoff. If t k (x) < d k , then there would exist a player who avoids donations or everyone donates and the sum of donations in season k = k exceeds the demand. Subsequently, by making this player donate in k, it would be possible to increase the payoff of this player. If t k (x) > d k , then we can improve upon the payoff of at least one player who donates in season k in strategy profile x, by making them not donate. The second step shows that it is a sufficient condition. We show that if t k (x) = d k for both k ∈ {s, w}, then no player can improve upon own payoffs by deviating from x. If the player is not donating in profile x, then the players deviation to donate in either season would be wasteful because the upper bound in both seasons would have been met. If the player is donating in k in profile x, then the players deviation to donate in the other season would be wasteful, while the withdrawal of donation would reduce the players marginal payoff from nu − c to 0.
Proposition 3 implies that, under the in full information condition, if all players are maximizing the payoff-sum of the n players, then Nash equilibrium would be efficient and the payoff-sum would be maximized. This game has multiple equilibria, and hence there may be a coordination problem on which equilibrium to play. However, within each equilibrium, the coordination problem associated with donation time is resolved.
For the partial information condition, however, similar efficient result will not hold. This is because the information about the upper bound is not known to the players, and hence it would be impossible to adjust donations to the upper bounds in the equilibrium. In order to show the inefficiency in the partial information condition, we start by showing that the amount donated in each season is going to be almost equal in the equilibrium. Lemma 1. Let x * be a Nash equilibrium of the game under the partial information condition, when all players are maximizing the payoff-sum. Subsequently, in equilibrium, the difference in the amount donated in each season would be at most 1.
The main point of this lemma is that the group's total donation in each season would be about the same in equilibrium. This is, essentially, because the expected marginal payoff from donating in season k decreases with the number of other players donating in that season. It is also because all combinations of (d s , d w ) have an equal likelihood of occurrence, and the expected upper bounds of the two seasons are ex-ante symmetric to the players. For instance, consider the case when all players, except i, lower their donations in season k than that in k and when the marginal payoff from donating in season k is positive. Subsequently, i s marginal payoff from donating in season k is also positive and higher than that when donating in k. Consequently, in equilibrium, almost the same number of players donate in each season. 9 Finally, we show that, under the partial information condition, depending on the size of the parameters of n relative to c and u, the set of Nash equilibrium would be one of the following two types: in one type of the equilibrium, only a subset of players donate, and, in the other type, all players donate. In both equilibria, the sum of donations in each season is almost equal. The former type of equilibria arises when the relative cost of donation c/u is larger than n, and the latter type arises when it is sufficiently small. Let us state this result more precisely in the next proposition.
Proposition 4. Let x * be a Nash equilibrium of the game under partial information condition, in which all players maximize the payoff-sum. 10
• When n ≥ 4c/u − 1, t k (x * ) = n/2 and t k (x * ) = n/2 for k, k ∈ {s, w}.
Proposition 4 implies that even if the players maximize the payoff-sum, there could still be expost inefficiencies in equilibrium under the partial information condition. There could be surplus and scanty donations depending on the realized values of d s and d w because the players cannot adjust their donation with respect to the upper bounds.
In reality, not all individuals are payoff maximizers or payoff-sum maximizers. Nonetheless, if there are some payoff-sum maximizers and if they believe that there are other similar players, then providing more information on the upper bounds may improve the overall efficiency. Propositions 3 and 4 together imply that players would respond to the demand information under the full information condition but not under the partial information condition. In order to investigate whether the increase in the information provision will increase efficiency, we investigate the two information conditions through a laboratory experiment. 9 There are two possible cases when the difference would equal 1. The first is a boundary case wherein the marginal expected payoff from donating in season k and k is exactly equal, when |t k (x * ) − t k (x * )| = 1. The second one is a special case in which the expected marginal payoff from donation is positive even when everyone is donating. In this case, if n is an odd number, then the difference would equal 1. 10 Here, we use · and · to represent operations to round up and round down the decimals to the nearest whole numbers. For instance, 5/2 = 3 and 5/2 = 2.
Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted in January and February 2017 at the experimental room CHOCOLA in Ritsumeikan University, Japan. One hundred and twelve subjects were recruited via posters and leaflets on campus. The proportion of undergraduate students and female students accounted for 92% and about 25.9% of the subjects, respectively. Although we recruited subjects from all departments in the campus, about half of the subjects were from the Economics department. To the best of our knowledge, the last economic experiment was conducted 4 years prior to our experiments at the Ritsumeikan University. Hence, for most subjects, this was their first economic experiment. 11
Experimental treatments and theoretical predictions
In the experiment, subjects repeatedly played a four-person multiple public goods game with upper bounds for 10 periods in the same group. The cost of donation c was 500 points, and the utility from the effective donation u was 250 points. We also gave an endowment of 500 points to remove the possibility of negative payoffs. Thus, subject i's payoffs in the experiment were
The main treatment variable in this experiment is the availability of the information on the upper bounds (i.e., demands). With n = 4, the possible combinations for the demands (d s , d w ) were {(1, 1), (2, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 1), and (1, 3)}. In each period of the game, separately for each group, one of the six combinations were randomly chosen by the computer with equal probability. In the full information treatment (sometimes abbreviated as full-info.), subjects were informed of the realized values of the demands before making their donation decision, whereas in the partial information treatment (sometimes abbreviated as Part-info.), subjects make their decision without a knowledge of the realized values. Treatment comparison was conducted in the between-subject design. Table 1 shows the summary of the treatments and the distribution of realized values of the demands.
With these parameters, the theoretical prediction of payoff-sum maximizing individuals, for the partial information treatment (based on Proposition 4), is that either 1 or 2 subjects would contribute to each treatment. In other words, any strategy profile x in which (t s (x), t w (x)) ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2)} would be a Nash equilibrium. 12
Experimental procedures
When the subjects entered the experimental room, they were randomly assigned a seat with a networkconnected computer terminal. To ensure anonymity among the subjects, the seats were partitioned to ensure that the computer monitors of the other subjects were unobservable. At the start of the experiment, the experimenter read out the consent forms and the subjects were given enough time to review the forms before signing. Subsequently, the subjects were shown a written instruction on the computer screen, which they were allowed to read at their own pace. After reading the instruction, the subjects solved a quiz to ensure their understanding of the rules of the game. Subjects' answers to the quiz questions were checked individually by the experimenters. The experimental program started after all the subjects answered all the quiz questions correctly. This ensured that all our subjects understood the (1,1) 16 28 (1,2) or (2,1) 43 46 (2,2) 23 34 (1,3) or (3,1) 38 52 (Note) Since the values of the demands were drawn randomly for each group in each period, the realized frequency of the demands is counted in terms of the number of groups. The total adds up to the (number of groups) × (number of periods), which is 120 in full-info. and 160 in Part-info. treatment. Table 1 : Summary of the treatments and the realized values of the demands rules of the experiment. We also read the answers aloud to ensure all the subjects that they all received the same instructions and that the rules of the game were common knowledge. It must be noted that the experiment was conducted using a neutral language. We refrained from using words like "donation" and "season" and used terms like "investments" and "projects," which are commonly used in the literature on experimental public goods games . In the experiment, the two seasons were called Projects A and B, and the demand was called the "necessary amount of investment." There are two main reasons why we decided to use a neutral language and refrained from using the blood donation frame. First, the use of a neutral framework would allow us to extend the applicability of the experimental results to other situations that could be modeled as a multiple public goods game with upper bounds. Second, we wanted to avoid uncontrollable heterogeneity among the subjects as the subjects may perceive the blood donation frame differently-some may place extra values to the donating behavior, whereas others may place extra costs.
Current Round
Your ID is 2. The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . The main and the only difference in the program between the two treatments lies in the design of the decision-making screen. In the full information treatment (see Figure 1(a) ), the subjects received information about the necessary amount of investment for each project, whereas, in the partial information treatment (see Figure 1(b) ), the realized values were left blank. Except for this difference, all the screen interfaces of the two treatments were identical. 13 In both treatments, subjects received the information about their identification number, which changed every period to reduce the reputation effect. Additionally, on the same screen, they made their decision by choosing one of the three following options: "invest in project A," "invest in project B," and "not invest." The end-of-period feedback information in both treatments were also identical. The subjects received information on the following: the choices by all the four group members, the necessary amount of investment for each project, the total amount of investment on each project, points gained from each project, the total point obtained from the two projects together, the points the subject kept, and the points gained in that period. After the final period, there was a final screen that enabled the subjects to confirm the results in each period.
After the 10 periods, subjects answered a questionnaire. Most of the questions were administered using z-tree, except for the social value orientations (SVOs) questions, which were administered on paper due to programming difficulties. 14 The subjects were paid for the points they had earned in the two randomly selected periods. After the completion of the 10 periods, the experimenter rolled two 10-sided dices to determine the payment period. 15 The subject received payment of 1 yen for each point earned in the experiment. The showup fee was 500 yen. The average payment was 1795 yen (which was about $16 at the time of the experiment) for an experiment that lasted less than 1.25 hours.
Experimental Hypothesis
As mentioned in Section 2.3, if there are some payoff-sum maximizing subjects, then they would try to match the demands in the full information treatment. Since the behavior in the partial information treatment does not vary with the demands, there could be excessive-or scanty donations, which could cause inefficiency. These theoretical results lead to the following two hypothesis, which we will test in the next section.
Hypothesis 1. In the full information treatment, the average donation rates in a season would increase with an increase in its demand.
Hypothesis 2. Efficiency would be higher in the full information treatment than in the partial information condition.
Results

Effects of demand information on the aggregate donation rates
To begin, we examine the aggregate propensity to donate (average donation rate) in either season. Recall that each subject can donate at most once in one of the two seasons in each period. Hence, the proportion of subjects donations in either season in each period yields the per-period aggregate donation rate. Figure 2 shows the trend of donation rates observed in full and partial information treatments. For both treatments, over 50% of subjects donated in the first period, and the donation rates declined over the periods. Averaging across the 10 periods, the mean donation rate of the full information treatment 13 For the partial information treatment, we did not remove the wordings like "The necessary amount of investment for this period were as follows" This was to make the subjects perceive that the values of the demands for that period were already pre-determined. 14 In social psychology, SVOs comprise a measure developed to distinguish individuals by a preference regarding their respective payoffs relative to the payoff of others. Based on subjects' responses to the questions on primary slider measures developed by Murphy, Ackermann and Handgraaf (2011) , we obtain parameters of SVOs and use them in the analysis in the next section. 15 When two rolled numbers turned out to be the same, we re-rolled one of the dices again to obtain another number.
(0.348) and that of the partial information treatment (0.375) were not statistically different. 16 Thus, we can state the following:
Result 1. The provision of information on the demand in each season has no effect on the aggregate propensities to donate. 
Effects of demand levels on donation rates in full information treatment
Result 1 implies that the "availability of information" on the demand does not have a significant impact on the aggregate donation rates. In relation to Hypothesis 1, we focus on the observations made in the full information treatment and examine whether and how the demand levels affect the average donation rates. First, we test whether donation rates differ with the sum of demands, by using 480 observations in the full information treatment. The first column of Table 2 reports donation rates, that is, the shares of individual decisions to donate in either season in each period. It can be noted that the greater the summed demand of the two seasons, the higher would be the individuals' propensity to donate. The odds ratios confirm this observation; when compared to the baseline case in which the total demand is two, the subjects are about 6.5 times more likely to donate than not when the total demand is 3, and 8.3 times more likely to donate than not when the total demand is 4. 17 The donation rates increase with the sum of upper bounds, that is, the total demand.
Next, we examine the relationships between individual choices regarding the donation seasons and demand sizes. Recall that, under the full information treatment, the subjects are informed of the demand in each of the two seasons, and they decide whether and in which season to donate. Figure 3 visualizes the propensity to donate in the season by the demand. When demand pairs are asymmetric, that is, (2,1), (1,2), (3,1) or (1,3), the donation rates in the season with a larger demand tend to be higher than 16 Using the decision of individuals to donate or not at each period as a unit of observation (480 observations for the full information treatment, and 640 observations for the partial information treatment), the p-value of the two-sample test of proportions is 0.351. Wilcoxon rank-sum test of comparison of group's average donation rates across 10 periods also supports no difference between the treatment( p=0.66).
17 Pairwise Bonferroni adjusted multiple comparisons of differences in odds ratios between total demands equaling 2 and 3 and 2 and 4 yield z values that are statistically significant (p ¡ 0.01)but not between total demands of 3 and 4 (p = 0.222).
Summed upper bound (Donation Rates)
Odds Ratio
Standard errors Z (p-value) . Logistic regression takes the log of the odds and yields the odds ratios using the summed upper bound = 2 as a base. (3,1) and (3,1) , the donation rates in the season with larger and smaller demands are 0.303 with a confidence interval [0.229, 0.376], and 0.092 with a confidence interval [0.046, 0.138], respectively. Facing asymmetric demands, donors tend to direct their donations to a season with a larger demand. Result 2 summarizes the above two findings. Result 2. (Donation rates increase with the demand) In the full information treatment, the donation rate increases, on an average, with an increase in the sum of demands. Additionally, subjects direct more donations to the season with a relatively high demand than to the season with a low demand.
Effects of demand information on individual decisions to donate
Until now, Result 1 indicated that the provision of information on seasonal demands (i.e., demand structure) has no significant impact on the aggregate donation rates. However, Result 2 indicated that, with an information on the demand structures, the average donation rates increase with the demand in such a way that more donations are directed toward the season with a larger demand. These observations prompt us to investigate whether and how the provision of information on the demand structure in the full information treatment affects decisions to donate at an individual level.
We regress an individual's donation choices against the informational treatment dummy, its interaction with the sum of demands in the two seasons, and some characteristics of the individual. Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 3 report the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) specification. The coefficient on information (dummy for the full information treatment) is not significantly different from zero in specification (1), which echoes Result 1. In specification (2), the coefficient on the interaction term between information and the sum of demands is positive and significant, while the coefficient on information is negative and significant. These imply countervailing effects of information; information on the summed demand increases individuals' propensities to donate, while the provision of information on the demand structure itself depresses the donation rates. As a result of these effects offsetting each other, there is no effect of the information provision on average (Result 1)-the point estimate of the predicted donation rate is 0.302, in the full information treatment, at the expected value of the summed demand (3.33), which is marginally lower than the estimated donation rate in the partial information treatment (0.329). Specification (3) includes additional control for subjects' SVOs. For the range of SVOs corresponding to the "prosocial" orientation, which is above 22.45 according to Murphy et al. (2011) , the observed association between the prosocial value orientation and individual donation rates is positive. However, for the "individualistic" and "competitive" ranges, the association is negative. Specifications (4), (5), and (6) use Probit models. Although it is known that probit specifications can introduce bias in the estimates of the interaction terms, the probit models produce qualitatively the same results as those with linear specifications. Thus, we can state the following.
Result 3. (Countervailing effects of information about demand structure on donation rates): On the one hand, the baseline effect of information about demand structure on donation rates is negative-the provision of information alone lowers the donation rate. On the other hand, the provision of demand structure directs the subject's donation toward the season with a higher demand.
Effect of demand information on the efficiency of group outcomes
According to Result 2, in the full information treatment, the average donation rate increases with an increase in demand, which supports Hypothesis 1. The countervailing effects of the information about demand structures on an individual's donation decision found in Result 3 are likely to exert ambiguous impacts on the efficiencies of group outcomes. Thus, we turn to examine Hypothesis 2, that is, the relationship between the provision of information on the demands and efficiencies of outcomes at group level. Figure 4 plots the average efficiency of group outcomes for each treatment. The efficiency is measured as a ratio of actually attained group profits to the maximum attainable group profit, over and above the minimum attainable group profit. 18 On an average, efficiency rates observed in the groups
Linear specification
Probit specification In this game, there are two sources of inefficiencies-one caused by scanty donations, and the other caused by excessive donation. We attempt to visualize the difference in the sources of inefficiencies by classifying each group outcomes into one of the following four categories: "Efficient," "Free-riding," "Coordination failure," or "Free-riding and coordination failure." "Efficient (EF)" refers to the case in which summed donation by group members exactly satisfies the demands of both seasons. "Free riding (FR)" occurs when the summed donation in each season is less than or equal to its demand; it is strictly less for at least one season. "Coordination failure (CF)" is the case in which summed donation in at least one season exceeds its demand, and the excess is enough to cover any shortage of donation directed to another season. "FR and CF" occur when the summed donation in only one season exceeds the demand and when the excess donation in one season is not sufficient to offset the shortage of the other. As an example, Figure 5 demonstrates the classification of these categories of outcomes when the demand structure is (2,1).
Eye-balling the frequency distribution of group outcomes by the efficiency categories in Table 4 , we notice that the provision of information seems to improve outcome efficiencies mainly by reducing coordination failures. Under the full information treatment, groups' outcomes are much less likely to be characterized as CF, with a ratio of 0.033, than that under the partial information treatment with a ratio of 0.081. Interestingly, the outcomes of FR and CF are dramatically rare under the full information treatment, with a ratio of 0.033, when compared to the partial information treatment case, with a ratio of 0.3. FR outcomes occur more frequently under the full information treatment than under the partial information treatment, and the frequencies of efficient (EF) outcomes do not appear different between the treatments. the parameter settings used in the experiment, the total actual group payoff, the maximum attainable group payoff, and the minimum attainable group payoff in this example are 2000, 3000, and 1000, respectively. Resulting efficiency measure amounts to 2000−1000 3000−1000 = 0.5. 19 Using each group's data in each period as a unit of observation, Wilcoxon Rank Sum test of the equality of distribution of unmatched data was performed; the test yields Mann-Whitney statistic of 1.512 (p=0.1306). 
Discussion
At the aggregate level, the result of our experiment shows the neutral effect of information about the demand (Result 1). At an individual level, the core effect of the information provision on the donation rate is even negative (Result 3). Recasting these findings on theoretical predictions advanced in the Experimental Design section, it may seem convincing to conclude that individuals are monetary payoff maximizers, and thus the provision of information on the seasonal demand does not lead to differences in individual donation behavior (Propositions 1 and 2). Further analysis of individual donation by the size of summed demands for both seasons reveals the countervailing effect of information, which drives a higher demand to induce a higher donation (Result 2). Additionally, a higher number of donations are made for the season with a higher demand, when subjects are informed of asymmetric demands between the two seasons (Result 3). The above implies that the provision of information on the demand of blood banks tends to depress the subjects' average donation rates, while the demand information directs more contributions to the public good with a relatively high demand. As the first attempt to solve these seemingly puzzling effects of demand information on individual donation behavior, we would like to advance conjecture related to strategic uncertainty and avoidance of risks of wastage emerging from excessive donation. According to the theory discussed in the section on experimental design, if all individuals are payoffsum maximizers and if they are informed of the upper bounds, then they would donate efficiently in equilibrium. Since there are a number of such equilibria, there might be an issue of selecting an equilibrium on which individuals can coordinate their donations. Uncertainty about each group member's action makes it difficult to coordinate among such equilibria. Owing to the underlying strategic uncertainty and coordination difficulty, payoff-sum maximizers may end up withholding donation to avoid potential wastage.
Particularly, when the demand is low, a strategic uncertainty may depress the donation of an efficiencyconcerned individual more. This is because the individual might perceive the inefficacy of own donations, and hence avoid donations. Under the full information treatment, when the demand structure is (d s , d w ) = (1, 1), almost all outcomes (15 out of 16, 93.7%, of group outcomes) are categorized as free-riding. When the demand structure is (d s , d w ) = (2, 2), free-riding outcomes occur less often (20 out of 23, 86.9%). In comparison, under the partial information treatment, corresponding frequencies of free-riding outcomes occur 16 out of 28 times (57.1%) when (d s , d w ) = (1, 1), and 24 out of 29 times (85.2%) when (d s , d w ) = (2, 2). With reference to the outcomes under the partial information treatment, the free-riding outcomes are observed more frequently under the full information treatment, particularly, when the demands are low. This piece of evidence supports our interpretation that the apparent negative effect of demand information on individual donation, at least partly, is associated with strategic uncertainty.
Conclusion
Efficient provisions in blood banks require overcoming the twin problems of coordination failure and free-riding. We investigate the role of information in enabling blood banks to overcome these problems and to improve their efficiency. According to the standard theory in which the players maximize their payoffs, information conditions do not affect an individual's donation behavior: The dominant strategy of players is to withhold donations, regardless of information conditions. On the contrary, if the players maximize the payoff-sum of all the players, then the information provision would increase the efficiency. This is because, when the information on the demands is made available, in equilibrium, payoff-sum maximizing individuals will match the upper bound in each season. However, when the demand information is not available, the donation in each season will be almost equal in equilibrium. This could cause over-and under-achievement of the realized upper bounds, thereby lowering the overall efficiency. Thus, we hypothesize that if there are some efficiency-concerned people, then providing demand information by including future needs will increase efficiency.
Based on the laboratory experiment, we find that information provision promotes individual donation in the season with a greater demand. However, at the aggregate level, the information on the future demand does not increase average donation rates or efficiency. This is because the difficulty of interpersonal coordination offsets the efficiency-enhancing effect of information as individuals tend to withhold donations to avoid wasteful, excessive contributions.
We conclude that the provision of information on the seasonal demand for blood does not solely improve the overall efficiency of blood banks. This can be attributed to the countervailing effects of information on the efficient provision of blood banks. In other words, information on demand helps blood banks to overcome the inter-seasonal coordination problem. However, such information provision may worsen the free-riding problem when potential donors fear wasteful, excessive over donation. The information provision for comprehensively improving efficiency may become possible when it is complemented by mechanisms to reduce strategic uncertainty and manage aversion to wasteful donations. Future studies could address these issues, for example, by using the framework of sequential voluntary contribution mechanism. Some experimental evidences associated with real-time voluntary contribution mechanism show that providing information about others' contributions and allowing subjects to adjust contributions upward increases the provision of public goods (Dorsey, 1992; Kurzban, McCabe, Smith and Wilson, 2001) . As Kurzban et al. (2001) point out, the real-time public goods game closely mirrors the mechanism discussed in Schelling (1960) (pp.45-46)-dividing contribution into smaller contributions lowers the risk of the initial contribution, thereby boosting contributions. Similar mechanisms, such as providing real-time information on donations with a prediction on demand, may improve the efficiency of blood donation. this probability, we can calculate the expected marginal payoff for player i from donating in season k as
Since u < c, this is clearly negative for any t k (x −i ) ≤ n, which is lower than the marginal payoff from not donating in either season. Thus, strategy (0, 0) strictly dominates (1, 0) and (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The proof consists of the following three steps.
Step 1: Given the strategies of all players, other than i, when compared to the case of not donating in either season, the marginal payoff for player i from donating in season k is nu − c when t k (x −i ) < d k , and it is −c when t k (x −i ) ≥ d k .
To show this, let x i = (0, 0), and x ik = 1 and x ik = 0. When t k (x −i ) < d k ,
Step 2: t k (x * ) = d k for k ∈ {s, w} is a necessary condition for x * to be a Nash equilibrium. We show this by contradiction. Assume that x * is a Nash equilibrium and that t k (x * ) = d k , for some k ∈ {s, w}.
[Case 1: t k (x * ) > d k for some season k] Since d k ∈ N, there are at least two players who donate in k. Let us call one of these players i. From Step 1, player i's marginal payoff from donating in k, compared to not donating, is −c. Thus, x * i is not a best response to x * −i . [Case 2: t k (x * ) < d k for some season k]
There are two possible sub-cases to consider: (i) t s (x * )+t w (x * ) = n, and (ii) t s (x * )+t w (x * ) < n. When (i) t s (x * ) + t w (x * ) = n, then t k (x * ) < d k implies that t k (x * ) > d k . Using the same argument as the above we can show that x * is not a Nash equilibrium. When (ii) t s (x * ) + t w (x * ) < n, there is at least one player who is not donating in either season. Let us call this person i. Since i's contribution in k is effective, the marginal payoff for player i from donating in season k is nu − c > 0. Thus, x * i is not a best response to x * −i . Therefore, if x * is a Nash equilibrium, t k (x * ) = d k .
Step 3: t k (x * ) = d k for k ∈ {s, w} is a sufficient condition for x * to be a Nash equilibrium. We begin by considering the case where a player i is not donating at the strategy profile x * . If player i deviates and donates in one of the seasons, then the marginal payoff of player i would be −c. This is because the upper bound is already met by the donations of the other players. Thus, x * i = (0, 0) is a best response to x * −i for non-donating players. Next, we consider the case where a player i is donating in season k at strategy profile x * . If player i deviates and donates in another season k = k, then the payoff of player i would decrease by nu > 0. This is because the upper bound for k is already met through other players' donations. Finally, if player i deviates and does not donate in either season, then i's payoff would decrease by nu − c > 0. For both deviations, player i's payoff decreases, and hence x * i is a best response to x * −i for donating players.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Using the probability in Equation (A.1), we can calculate the expected marginal payoff of player i from donating to season k compared to not donating as
For the payoff-sum maximizing individuals, the values of the expected marginal payoff can be positive. Hence, an individuals decision to donate can be optimal.
One point to note is that because P (t k (x −i ) < d k ) is decreasing in t k (x −i ) for 0 ≤ t k (x −i ) ≤ n−1, the expected marginal payoff for player i from donating in season k also decreases in t k (x −i ). Hence, if t k (x −i ) < t k (x −i ), then it would be better to donate in season k than to donate in season k .
Suppose that x * is a Nash equilibrium and |t s (x * ) − t w (x * )| ≥ 2. We denote the season with a higher donation as k and the other as k . Let i be a donor in k in x * . Then, Therefore, in what follows, we consider the conditions for t * only. First, we check the possibility of t * < 0. This is a trivial case in which it will never be optimal for the player i to donate in season k. It can be verified that if nu > c, then t * > 0. Hence, t * > 0 in our game.
Next, we examine the condition t * ≥ (n − 1)/2. If this condition holds, then, because of Lemma 1, all players would be donating in one of the two seasons in equilibrium.
By rearranging the equations, we find that:
t * ≥ (n − 1)/2 ⇐⇒ 1 2 (2n − 1) − 4c(n − 1) u + 1 ≥ n − 1 2 ⇐⇒ n ≥ 4c(n − 1) u + 1 ⇐⇒ n 2 − 4cn/u + 4c/u − 1 ≥ 0.
This inequality holds when n ≤ 1 or when n ≥ 4c/u − 1. 20 Since we assume that n ≥ 2, only the second condition needs to be considered. We can summarize our results depending on whether the second condition is satisfied. When n ≥ 4c/u − 1, t * ≥ (n − 1)/2, and hence player i chooses to donate in season k. This donation would continue up to the point where half of the population donates in k. Since the number of donors in season k is less than or equal to that of the other season, in the equilibrium, every player would be donating to one of the two seasons. Thus, t k (x * ) = n/2 and t k (x * ) = n/2 . When n < 4c/u − 1, t * < (n − 1)/2. Hence, except for the boundary cases, only a subset of players would be donating. In this case, player i would donate if t k (x * −i ) ≤ t * . Since the players are symmetric, the total number of donors in each season would be t * + 1 = t * in both seasons if t * is not a whole number. If t * is a whole number, then player i would be indifferent between donating and not donating when t k (x * −i ) = t * . In this case, the total number of donors in each season would be either t * or t * + 1. Thus, t k (x * ) ∈ { t * , t * + 1} for k ∈ {s, w}. 20 It can be verified that 1 < 4c/u − 1 when 2c > u, which is satisfied under our assumption that c > u.
